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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DARRIN LAMAR PELTON, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
v. 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
Case No. 
Priority No. 2 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
DARRIN LAMAR PELTON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 890509-CA 
Priority No. 2 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OPINION BELOW 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals in State v. Pelton, 
147 Utah Adv. Rep. 36 (Utah App. 1990), is attached hereto as 
Appendix A. On November 14, 1990, Petitioner timely filed a 
Petition for Rehearing in the Court of Appeals. On November 28, 
1990, the Court of Appeals denied Appellants Petition for 
Rehearing. A copy of that Court's order denying the Petition for 
Rehearing is attached hereto as Appendix B. 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals filed its opinion on 
November 9, 1990. Appellant filed his Petition for Rehearing on 
November 14, 1990 and it was denied on November 28, 1990. The 
Petition for Rehearing tolled the period in which this Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari must be filed. Utah R. App. P. 48(c). This 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari is therefore timely filed. Utah R. 
App. P. 48. Jurisdiction is pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(5) 
(Supp. 1988) and Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1988). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for 
Offering, Agreeing, Consent, or Arranging to Distribute a Controlled 
Substance, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1989) (effective until July 1, 1990). 
After a bench trial held June 13, 1989, Mr. Pelton was convicted as 
charged by the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge, presiding in the 
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The State charged Mr. Pelton with one count of Offering, 
Agreeing, Consenting, or Arranging to Distribute a Controlled 
Substance, to wit: cocaine, a second degree felony. The facts 
pertinent to this case are stated in the Court of Appeals' decision 
and, where appropriate, in the argument section of this petition. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Proof of causation is a necessary element for a criminal 
conviction. The State never proved that the actions of the 
Petitioner, Darrin Pelton, provided the necessary nexus for a drug 
transaction. Two separate sets of acts should be considered. In 
the first, Petitioner Pelton/s conduct—even if considered 
improper—should not be deemed criminal because of the intervening 
conduct of the involved undercover agent. Petitioner cannot be 
considered a "middleman" because he never linked the agent to the 
next person involved in the drug transaction. Secondly, the drug 
transaction began anew after the agent told his informant to contact 
a middleman (not the Petitioner) who, in turn, contacted a drug 
dealer. The Petitioner was not involved in the second transaction. 
Utah's appellate courts have found individuals liable if 
they "acted" in furtherance of a drug transaction. The prohibition 
against "any act," however, does not contemplate intervening conduct 
by an agent which renders harmless the initial "culpable" conduct of 
the involved individual. By failing to account for the necessary 
nexus or lack thereof, the Court of Appeals' decision did not 
properly address the element of causation in an intended drug 
transaction. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS DID 
NOT CONSIDER THE ELEMENT OF CAUSATION 
The Court of Appeals erroneously concluded that the 
conduct of the Petitioner, Darrin Pelton, was "one link in a chain 
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of events . . . which eventually led to the sale of cocaine." 147 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 36. Petitioner Pelton did not constitute a 
necessary link. The "link," if any, broke when the undercover agent 
voluntarily terminated Mr. Pelton's involvement. Even if the Court 
of Appeals correctly concluded that Mr. Pelton acted with the 
requisite criminal intent, his behavior should not have been deemed 
criminal without proof of the element of causation. Causation was 
never proven. 
Utah appellate courts have decided countless cases 
involving the sale of drugs, but they have never specifically 
addressed exactly when, if ever, the intervening actions of an agent 
will release the initial "participants" from criminal liability, 
(i.e. should an involved individual always be considered liable, as 
the Court of Appeals decision implies, no matter what the undercover 
agent may later do or say to call off the planned "sting" 
operation?) At what point will the conduct of the agent preclude a 
finding of causation? 
Petitioner concedes that "middlemen" in the sale of drugs 
can be held accountable for their involvement in the transaction. 
However, "middlemen" no longer exist if an agent ends an intended 
transaction and then begins another transaction on his own. In such 
a scenerio, as occurred in the case at bar, the "middleman" of the 
initial transaction suddenly becomes the last link in an ill-advised 
(but noncriminal) series of events. 
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Petitioner Pelton met an agent at a meeting place and 
told him, in substance, to go to a 7-Eleven where they would call a 
man and wait for the cocaine. The Court of Appeals noted that "the 
trial court could properly conclude that defendant [Pelton] knew 
that he would be the triggering mechanism in bringing [agent] Acosta 
and Paco together when he had Acosta drive to the 7-11 store, and 
that he also knew the transaction involved the sale of cocaine." 
Slip. op. at 3. Knowing that one would be the triggering mechanism 
as opposed to actually being the triggering mechanism are two very 
different concepts. Causation is shown only by proof of the latter 
situation. 
If Mr. Pelton had introduced the agent to the cocaine 
dealer, the "link" would have continued with Mr. Pelton remaining 
liable for his actions. However, because the agent ended 
Mr. Pelton's involvement at the 7-Eleven, and because the agent 
initiated a new transaction by telling his informant to contact the 
real "middleman," Lorraine Coates, who, in turn, introduced the 
agent to the cocaine dealer, causation existed only for the second 
transaction (with Coates—not Pelton—liable for "arranging" the 
transaction). No nexus linked the initial transaction involving 
Mr. Pelton with the subsequent transaction involving Ms. Coates 
because of the intervening conduct of the agent. 
If other courts follow the Court of Appeals' decision in 
the future (as undoubtedly will be the case with the ever present 
nature of drug transactions), the decision will allow an agent to 
arbitrarily end an intial transaction with one participant, begin 
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another transaction an hour, a day, or a week later with another 
participant, and then hold the initial participant liable for the 
second transaction. Greater guidelines must be incorporated into 
the Court of Appeals' decision on the element of causation. Nothing 
stated in existing opinions specifically address the outer limits of 
causation for drug transactions. Most opinions have stated only 
what is permissible. See, e.g.. State v. Ontiveros, 674 P.2d 103 
(Utah 1983). 
POINT II. THE STATUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS 
APPLIED TO PETITIONERS CASE 
Closely related to the arguments summarized above are 
arguments pertaining to the all encompassing nature of the 
applicable statute, Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8. The statute prohibits 
any person from "agreeing, consenting, offering, arranging, or 
negotiating" the distribution of a controlled substance. While 
these five activities may be constitutionally proscribed, see 
State v. Harrison, 601 P.2d 922 (Utah 1979), the type of proscribed 
conduct which falls under each activity remains unclear. 
Prior decisions have prohibited "any act" taken in 
furtherance of arranging to distribute . . . a . . . controlled 
substance . . . ." 147 Utah Adv. Rep. at 36; see also State v. Gray, 
717 P.2d 1313 (Utah 1986)) ("any witting or intentional lending of 
aid in the distribution of drugs, in whatever form the aid takes, is 
proscribed by the act"). However, an analysis addressing the 
unconstitutionality of the "drug" statute as applied to the 
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potentially intervening actions of the undercover agent has never 
been conducted by Utah's appellate courts. Absent such an analysis, 
Petitioner submits that the nebulous definition did not give him 
adequate notice of the proscribed conduct and was unconstitutional 
as applied to him because "any act" did not contemplete intervening 
conduct. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Pelton respectfully requests this Court to grant his 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari to review the issues addressed 
herein. Jrf 
SUBMITTED this day of 
ELIZABETH Ay BOWMAN 
Attornqyfar Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, ELIZABETH A. BOWMAN, hereby certify that ten copies of 
the foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Supreme Court, 332 State 
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 and four copies to the Attorney 
General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, 
this day of December, 1990. 
DELIVERED by this day 
of December, 1990. 
- 8 -
APPENDIX A 




147 Utah Adv. Rep. 36 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
The STATE of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Darrin Lamar PELTON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 890509-CA 
FILED: November 9, 1990 
Third District, Salt Lake Coun ty 
H o m e r F . Wilkinson 
A T T O R N E Y S : 
Rona ld S. Fuj ino and Elizabeth A . B o w m a n , 
Salt Lake City, for Appel lant 
R. Pau l Van D a m and Char lene Barlow, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Billings, Garff, and O r m e . 
_•• OPINION 
GARFF, Judge: 
Defendant, Darrin Lamar Pelton, appeals 
his conviction of arranging to distribute a 
controlled substance, in violation of § 58-37-
8(l)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1990), arguing that his inv-
olvement did not rise to the level of criminal 
culpability. 
FACTS 
Both parties generally agree on the facts. 
Albert Acosta, a narcotics agent, worked with 
a confidential informant to set up a drug buy 
through Lorraine Coates, who was to intro-
duce Acosta to a drug dealer, "Paco". Subs-
equently, pursuant to instructions from 
another intermediary* Acosta, Chris Baker and 
the confidential informant picked up defen-
dant. Defendant then told Acosta to drive to a 
7-11 store where they were to make a phone 
call and then "the man would bring the 
cocaine to that location." At the store defen-
dant and Baker got out of the car and spoke 
to a man in a telephone booth, who turned 
out to be Paco. Coates was also present. 
Acosta told Coates he was uncomfortable with 
defendant and Baker present, so Coates called 
Paco over and defendant and Baker left. The 
drug purchase was later consummated between 
Paco and Acosta at a different location. 
S T A N D A R D OF REVIEW 
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence 
at a bench trial , as occurred here , we will no t 
set aside the verdict unless clearly e r roneous , 
and where the result is against the clear weight 
of the evidence, or we otherwise reach a def-
inite and firm conviction that a mis take has 
been made . State v. Walker, 743 P .2d 191, 
193 (Utah 1987); U tah R. Civ. P . 52(a). 
Arranging to Distribute 
Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) 
(Supp. 1990)1 provides, "it is unlawful for any 
person to knowingly and intentionally ... 
arrange to distribute a controlled ... subst-
ance." In State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313 (Utah 
1986), the supreme court in interpreting the 
statute that preceded the above section, stated 
that "any witting or intentional lending of aid 
in the distribution of drugs, in whatever form 
the aid takes, is proscribed by the act. In other 
words, any act in furtherance of arrang(ing) to 
distribute ... a ... controlled substance* cons-
titutes a criminal offense pursuant to the 
statute." Id. at 1320-21 (emphasis in original) 
(quoting State v.Harrison, 601 P.2d 922, 923-
24 (Utah 1979)). 
J Defendant argues that it was Coates who 
actually called Paco over to the car and intr-
oduced him to Acosta, and that he never 
possessed the cocaine, never directed Acosta to 
the house where the cocaine was purchased, 
was not present when the transaction occu-
rred, and never discussed prices or handled 
any money. Therefore, defendant argues, he 
cannot be considered a participant in the arr-
angement. He cites several cases to support 
this position: State v. Renfro, 735 P.2d 43, 44 
(Utah 1987) (defendant discussed the purchase 
with officers, set a price, and agreed to make 
the exchange); State v. Ontiveros, 674 P.2d 
103 (Utah 1983) (court described defendant's 
activities to be a classic case of arranging 
when defendant directed an undercover officer 
to the drug buy location, procured money 
from the officer, purchased the drugs, and 
delivered the marijuana to him); State v. Clark, 
783 P.2d 68 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (defendant 
attempted to contact the drug dealer, comm-
ented on the quality of the cocaine, was 
present during the sale negotiations and 
warned the undercover officer of a tailing 
car). However, nothing in these cases prevents 
the inclusion of the acts of defendant within 
the statutory prohibition. 
We conclude that defendant's actions were 
sufficient to bring him within the proscription 
of the statute as interpreted by Gray and Har-
rison. Defendant was one link in a chain 
of events, involving six people, which event-
ually led to the sale of cocaine. There was 
ample evidence from which the trial court 
could properly conclude that defendant knew 
that he would be the triggering mechanism to 
bringing Acosta and Paco together when he 
had Acosta drive to the 7-11 store, and that 
he also knew the transaction involved the sale 
of cocaine. The fact that Paco was present at 
the 7-11 store negated the need to make the 
phone call to have the cocaine delivered. 
Defendant and Coates each spoke to Paco at 
the telephone booth. Paco then made contact 
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
CODE«CO Stouffer Foods Corp. v. Industrial Commission 
Provo, Utah 147 Utah Adv. Rep 37 37 
with Acosta and subsequently sold him the 
cocaine. Defendant acted knowingly and int-
entionally, and he was instrumental in arran-
ging the sale of the cocaine. 
Constitutional Application 
Defendant also asserts that the arranging 
statute was unconstitutionally applied to his 
case. Defendant argues that the supreme court 
in Srafe v. Harrison, by proscribing "any 
activity," unconstitutionally broadened the 
application of the arranging statute. The lan-
guage in question is as follows: 
A statute may legitimately proscribe 
a broad spectrum of conduct with a 
very few words, so long as the outer 
perimeters of such conduct are 
clearly defined. The statute in que-
stion accomplishes this by specif-
ying that any activity leading to or 
resulting in the distribution ... of a 
control led substance must be 
engaged in knowingly or with intent 
that such distribution would, or 
would be likely to occur. Thus, any 
witting or intentional lending of aid 
in the distribution of drugs, what-
ever form it takes, is proscribed by 
the act. 
610 P.2d at 923 (emphasis added). 
Defendant's argument is that Harrison 
renders the arranging portion of the statute 
unconstitutionally vague. A law is impermis-
sibly vague when it "fails to give a person of 
ordinary intelligence fair notice" that a cont-
emplated act is forbidden. Bouie v. City of 
Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 351 (1964) (quoting 
United States v. Harris, 347 U.S. 612, 617 
(1954)). The underlying principle is that one 
should not be held criminally responsible for 
conduct in cases where one could not unders-
tand the proscription. Id. 
In Harrison the Utah Supreme Court holds 
that the arranging statute is such that "[t]he 
citizen of average intelligence is left with no 
confusion as to what type of conduct is forb-
idden " 601 P.2d at 923-24. We see Harrison 
as a legitimate definition of "arrange" as used 
in Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) 
(Supp. 1989). Harrison clarifies rather than 
confuses the scope of the arranging statute. 
Thus, totally aside from the conceptual 
problem presented by this court's presuming 
to declare that a prior supreme court decision 
rendered a criminal statute unconstitutional, as 
defendant would have us do, we find defen-
dant's contention to be without merit. 
Affirmed. 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
1. Prior to 1987, arranging for the distribution of a 
controlled substance, Utah Code Ann. §58-37-
8(l)(a)(iv) (1986), was a separate offense from actual 
distr ibution. Utah Code Ann. §§58-37-
8(l)(a)(ii) (1986), 58-37-8(l)(c) (1986). In 1987, 
section 58-37-8(1 )(a)(ii), as amended, combined 
the offenses of arranging and distributing into one 
section. State v. Clark, 783 P.2d 68, 69 n.l (Utah 






































IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS NOV 2 8 1990 
OOOOO |*rvT. toofw 
Ct*M<« *» Court 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Darrin Lamar Pelton, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Before Judges Billings, Garff, and Orme. 
ORDER DENYING PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
Case No. 890509-CA 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon Appellee's 
Petition for Rehearing, filed November 14, 1990, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Appellee's Petition for Rehearing 
is denied. 
zsfa Dated this &° day of November, 1990. 
FOR THE COURT 
1/JjJ \($£M^ 
ary T./Nobnan, Clerk 
